Introduction
Much has been made of the role of capital flows and financial speculators in the context of global integration. Yet in much of the literature on reforms to the international financial system , it is taken for granted that the econom ic benefits of broader and deeper liberalised financial markets and the economic role that speculators play in these markets is well understood. In the early I 990s, the industrialised countries, particularly the United States and Europe, have unabashedly promoted financial liberalisation as the obvious and inevitable policy choice for developing and emerging economies.
Following the financial crises of 1994 and 1997, however, criticism of globalised financial markets for their shortcomings has been unremitting. Various policy-making fora have also followed this path, concentrating on risks and considering ways in which to contain the level or constrain the pace of financial liberalisation and global activities of financial speculators, as opposed to promoting the benefits of continued I iberalisation as they once had. Because of advances in telecommunications and financial engineering, continuing integration of financial markets appears inevitable.
If history has anything to offer us, as James (1999) argues, liberalisation can be reversed. The lack of clear and consistent leadership in international economics may explain, in part, the recent surge in isolati oni sm and protectionism . Leadership in this complicated issue area requires close 114 Shaping a New Imernalional Financial Sy. \·lem attention to the normative and positive aspects of financial libe rali sation in order to gain credibility to co-ordinate at the internatio nal level and advocate at the national level.
Capital market liberalisation has become an appealing goa l to many nations because of the perceived allocative benefits and effic iency gains. The risks inherent in this process, however, have been made painfull y obv io u and, as a result, policy makers have elected to "re form " the financial systemmeaning measures des igned to prevent possible crises and better manage those that do occur -so as to maximise said benefits while minimising the risks. The overall purpose of this chapter is to offer an understanding of the basis for a strengthening or reform of the international financial system and, therefore, the rationale behind the preventative reforms advanced by the G7 Finance Ministers. It seeks to add to the existing literature by identifying and discussing, in an accessible manner, the root benefits of capital market liberalisation, the risks and imperfections inherent itl capital markets. and the constraints that liberalised capital markets place o n the conduct of m icroeconom ic and macroeconom ic po l icies. The role of finan c ial speculators in the recent financial crises in East Asian is also cons idered . In tead of offering yet another list of reform proposal s. this chapter focusses o n those proposals most likely to be acted upon, that is, those drafted by the G7 Finance Ministers in Strengthening the International Financial Architecture. Rep ort o/the G 7 Finance Ministers to the K61n Economic Summit. Finally, as the members of the G7 are the architect of the current international financial system, they have key responsibilities in its refo rm and manageme nt. We outline these responsibilities in the final section.
The conclusion drawn here is that the G7 has put forward worthy proposals for reducing variability and for respondin g to and containing future crises. These proposals should be acted on with haste. The G7 ha s fallen short, however, in providing the likely victims of future crises. the la rger emerging and developing economies, with so lid working proposals and examples appropriate to the conditions of these econom ies and broader participation in the reform process. The G7 Ministers' report implies that market participants will continue to be the principal agents press ing the integration of the financial systems of the major developed economies with those of the emerging and developing econom ies . Likewise the ma rket wi II continue to be the primary supervisor of macroeconomic and exc han ge rate policies, rewarding nations with sound and credible policy and punishing those without. Nonetheless, the G7 has key respon s ibilities in the reform process and in managing these markets .
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Benefits of International Capital Flows
Advocates of capital market liberalisation argue that unhindered capita l movements a llow savings to flow to their most productive use and, therefore, financial speculators play an important and beneficial role as they are th e agents that provide liquidity, regardless of host location , to projects with potentially high marginal products. Those projects that do eventuate in hi gh returns reward speculators for the ri sk they have assumed. In thi s way, resources are directed in the most efficient pattern , resulting in real sector development and productivity increases. Financia l speculators, therefore, take the risky s ide ofa financial transaction and provide essentia l liquidity to the economy.
With access to foreign capital, domestic households and bu s inesses may expand their lending and borrowing activ iti es abroad, a llowing agents to continue to spend and invest during domestic economic downturns and repay during periods of economic growth, thereby mitigating typical business cyc les. Hence, domestic agents can diversify savings internationally and reduce their exposure to domestic economic shocks. These positive aspects reinforce capita l flows as domestic residents enj oy higher risk-adjusted rates of return, spurring yet higher levels of sav in g and in vestment activity. In turn, increased saving and investment induce additiona l economic growth .
For developing nations in particular, access to g loba l capita l reduces the cost offinanci ng investment projects considerab ly. More investment projects are undertaken, leading to real sector development. In the long run, this translates into higher standards ofliving as higher rates of growth are enjoyed. Private specu lative capita l, therefore, may substitute fo r uncertain development aid that often comes w ith inefficiency costs a sociated with bureaucratic red tape and constraints.
The Role of Financial Intermediaries
For specu lative capita l flows to del iver prom ised real sector development and growth, a well-developed system of financial intermediaries is required . Pagano ( 1993) identifies three key functions of financial intermed iation that lead to economic growth. The first is funnelling savings to firms with minimum x-inefficiencies. The process of intermediation absorbs a fraction of each dollar of savings so that less than one dollar is invested . An efficient system of intermediaries faces low reserve requ irements, transaction taxes and unnecessary regulation , reducing these inefficiencies.
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Secondly, financial intermediaries make it poss ible for man y people to pool their funds together, thereby increasing the size, or scale. of the amount of total amount ofsavings managed by a central authority. This centralisation of management can reduce average fund-management costs be low the level s that savers would incur if they were to manage their savi ngs a lone. thereby enjoying financial economies of scale. In thi s way. intermediaries may increase the amount of savings ultimately invested by reduc ing unnecessary costs.
Another outcome of an efficient system of intermediaries is the reduction of information asymmetries and an improvement of capital allocation and market stability. An information asymmetry exists when one party to a transaction, say a borrower, has more or better information than does the other party, the lender. For financial markets in particular, information asymmetries can lead to a number of potential problems including inefficient allocation of avings, herding behaviour. and even financial cr"sis. Intermediaries who specialise in the assessment of the quality of debt in struments and continuously monitor the performance of firms that issue these instruments are able to reduce the degree of information imperfections.
Intermediaries also provide a means for savers to pool risk. If savers are unable to pool risk, they will invest in the most liquid projects. More productive but less liquid projects are not financed , resulting in lowe r potential economic growth. Hence, intermediaries playa key three-part role : relying on their informational capabilities, they evaluate investment projects and determine those with the highest marginal product and then induce savers to invest in higher risk but more profitable projects through ri sk sharing at reduced average costs.
Financial Sec/or Developmenl and Economic Growlh
Reduced costs, hi g her quality information , and the poo ling of ri sk are o nl y some of the ways in which intermediaries may affect the rate of aving in an economy. Economic theory shows, however, that tinancial secto r development may either increase or decrease saving and th e effect 0 11 economic growth is unclear a priori. Improvements in hedg ing instruments may reduce precautionary saving and improvements in hou e ho ld credit markets may allow agents to di ssave in favour of current consumption o r lowmarginal-benefit projects. Hence, if financial development induces lower sav ing. economic growth Illay suffer. Capilol Flows: Maximising Bene/ils. Minimising Risks / 17 One view on the contribution of the financial sector is that lo ng-run trend performance is determined solely by real sector development. An alternative view is that the development of the financial sector alters econom ic fundamentals and, therefore, alters long-run performance. Why financial development evolves differently across econom ies and the casual relation ship between financial development and real sector growth is still unclear. Recent empirical literature, however, supports the view that financial development does indeed affect economic growth. Eatwell and Taylor (1998) argue, therefore, that the ultimate measure of a system of intermed iaries is the effect on the real sector of the economy.
Glubal
Misallocation of Capital
The fact that " reform " of the international financial system is being widely discussed is an admittance that unhindered financial markets do not achieve the utopian view of effic ient capital allocation expressed above . Such an outcome is the quintessence that one would like to see reached , but there are a numberofmarket imperfections and policy-created distortions that cause the system to fall short. In the presence of a deep and well-regulated system of intermediaries, financial development and capital market liberali sation may positively affect the path of potential long-run growth. Yet, under lesser conditions, intermediaries may channel capital flows in ways that underm ine domestic policies, increase shocks and contagion, and trigger financial crises (Crockett, 1997, p. 7) . The benefits of efficient capital allocation described above may be offset and economic growth actually suffer.
The potential costs of financial crises is well documented in the literature. For example, it is believed that the costs of the 1980s banking crisis in Argentina equalled one-half of the nation 's GDP, while the United States ' bailout of banks during the early 1990s totalled at least US$200 billion . The 1995 real estate collapse in Japan resulted in the nonperformance of more than US$250 billion in bank loans . In South Korea more than 10 percent o f all bank loans are nonperforming, and for India and China nonperformin g loans are estimated to be nearly 20 percent of outstanding loan s. Since 1980, the International Monetary Fund (1M F) estimates that 133 of 181 1M F member nations have suffered banking problems it considers to be "s ignificant" (Lindgren, et al. 1996 ).
The conclusion is that there are potential allocative and efficiency ga ins to be enjoyed from liberalising capital markets . A well-developed and regulated system of intermediaries is necessary for these ga ins to be realized.
T his is not a sufficie nt cond it io n, however, as there are po licy-c reated d istortio ns a nd fi nanc ia l markets imperfectio ns that mu st be dea lt wi th . Wi th th e potenti a l benefits of fin a nc ia l specul ati o n and th e importa nce of a we lldeve lo ped fin anc ia l market in cha nn e lling g lo ba l funds outlined. th e ri ks a nd po licy constra ints inherent in libera li sed fi na nc ia l markets are cons idered next.
Financial Markets and Economic Policy
• T here are a number of potenti a l imperfect io ns and ri sks inherent in Ii nanc ia l markets. It is useful to foc us o n th ose th at are centra l to th e stabi lity of g loba l ca pi ta l ma rkets. For libera li sed ca pita l markets to fun ction at th e leve l o r practi ca l expectati o ns, m icroecono m ic and macroecono m ic po l ic ies mu st be consistent w ith an environm ent of free-fl ow in g caiJi ta l. To pro mote sta bili ty of the syste m, th ese po li cy constra ints must be rea lised and res pected, po li cyc reated di sto rti o ns m inimi sed, and imperfec ti o ns addressed .
Risks. Distortions. and Microecol1omic Policy
O ne ty pe of market imperfecti on, th at of asy mm etri c info rm ati o n. is be li eved by some economists to pervade tinanc ia lm arkets in particu lar (E ic hengreen, e l al. 1999). As di scussed a bove, asy mmetri c infor matio n ca n induce an ineffic ie nt di stribution of capita l and increased ma rket vo latility. Two key pro bl e ms assoc iated wi th info rm ati o n asy mmetries are adverse se lectio n and he rdin g behav io ur. In fin a nc ia l tra nsactions, le nd e rs are often not privy to a ll of the info rm at io n -pa rti c ul arl y in fo rm ati o n abo ut ri sk -regard ing a ca pita l investme nt proj ect. T he ex istence of an inform ati on gap between savers and bo rrowers can result in adverse selecti on. or the potentia l for th ose w ho des ire funds fo r un worthy projects to be the most like ly to want to borrow o r to issue de bt in strum e nts. A result of adverse se lection is that the iss uance of poorqua lity instrum ents ca n make savers less w illing to lend to o r ho ld de bt in strum ents iss ued by those seekin g to ti na nce hig h-qua lity p r~iec t s (Da ni e ls and Va nHoose 1999). Additi ona ll y, poor info rm ati on may result in he rd in g be hav io ur. T hat is, in th e presence of inform ati o n ga ps. avers fo llow the be hav io ur of someone e lse they fee l is bette r info rm ed. In a g lo ba l co ntext, he rding be hav io ur can be a catalyst for contagio n a nd spreading financ ia l insta bility to regiona l leve ls. Herding be hav io ur ca n a lso lead to a red uctio n of asset prices or currency va lues th at greatl y exceeds what is warranted.
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I n g lo ba l ca pita l markets, th e pro blem o f info rm ati on asy mm etri es ca n be extens ive as multinati o nal e nterpri ses engage in transacti on spa nnin g the g lobe. Hig h-quality interm ediari es are able to reduce th e degree of asy mm etric informati on by hav ing offi ces around th e world , creating economi es of sca le in inform ati on process ing. By continuo us ly monito rin g and evaluating the performance and acti v ities of multinati ona l e nterpri ses, th ey are a ble to reduce, a lbe it not e liminate, info rm ati on asy mm etri es a nd th e re by encourage sav ings and reduce herdin g behav io ur.
An other potenti a l pro bl em is th at of mo ral hazard . th at is the bo rrower e ngages in behav io ur that increases ri sk after the de bt in strum e nt has been purchased. Aga in interm edi aries are abl e to reduce mo ra l hazard by continuo us ly mo nito rin g the perfo rm a nce of th e borrower. In th e context of g lo ba l capital markets and in I ight of recent fina nc ia l c ri ses, mora l hazard may a rises when a domesti c government implic itly g ua rantees th at a tirm o r ba nk w ill not be a llowed to fa il. Intern ati onal o rganisati ons. such as th e I M F. have a lso been accu sed of creating mo ra l hazard when stand ing by ready to ba i l o ut sovere ig n nati o ns facin g a liquidity cris is.
. Fina ll y, capita l fl ows may respo nd to po li cy-c reated d isto rti o ns. leadin g to a n in efficie nt and capric ious a ll ocati on of capita l. Cooper ( 1999) po i nts o ut th at di ffe renti a l nati ona l taxati o n, trade restri cti o ns. and macroecono m ic po lic ies are but a fe w po licy-created disto rti ons that may lead to a mi sallocati o n of capital. In addition. d ifferenti a l natio na l regul atio n o n financ ia l transacti o ns may generate regulatory arbitrage. whe n do mesti c in stitutions e ither locate abroad or conduct certa in ty pes of o perati o ns a broad in o rd er to avo id domesti c regulati o n a nd supe rvis ion. Thi s miti gates the regulato ry abiliti es of governments and exposes domesti c inte rm edia ri es to th e very ty pes of ri sk regul ators seek to minimi se. T hese di sto rtions result fro m do mesti c microeco nomic po lic ies yet need to be judged in a n internatio na l context as we ll. Without pro pe r intern ati ona l co-ope ratio n a nd co-ordinati on. there exists a potenti a l " race to the botto m ' o r a move to th e regulatory and tax e nvironm ent of the least strin gent nati on.
Financial Markel Liberalisalion and Macroeconomic Policy
Financ ia l market libera lisati on a lso constra in s mac roecono mic po l icy in ways determined by th e exchange rate reg im e, o ne of the most impo rta nt macroecono mic in stitutional cho ices a natio n faces. For develo pin g nati o ns. the exchange rate is an extreme ly impo rtant no min a l price th at affects expo rt performance. the cost of important commodities and inputs. a nd directing business planning and investment. Peggi ng the exchan ge rate. th erefo re. is an attractive option. The well-known " impossible trinity" of lixed exchan ge rates, capital mobility, and discretionary monetary policy prescribes that the e three conditions cannot exist s imultaneou s ly and po licy makers must be willing to forgo one aspect. I For developing, transitional , and emerging nations seeking to gain exchange rate stability and domestic price credibility through pegged-exchange rates while liberalising financial markets to take advantage of cheaper foreign financing, the lesson is that monetary authorities must be independent and conduct policy in a manner consistent with the first two objectives. This means that discretionary monetary policy via sterilised foreign exchange interventions is not sustainable in the long run. The typical outcome of countries trying to practice all three is an overvalued currency and inevitable devaluation. I n turn, the devaluation focusses attention o n the improper past conduct of monetary policy and "the loss of credibility is dramatic. As a result, the devaluation often leads to a complete collapse of the exchange rate regime and eventual floating of the currency until a new trading floor is found and the currency stabi I ises .
Developing nations, therefore, face a dilemma; should they c hoose fixed or flexible exchange rates? Cooper (1999) , an advocate of a common world currency, see the only practical choices as being flexible exchan ge rates and some type of capital controls or capital market liberali sat ion and strong ly fixed exchange rates with the complete loss of di scretionary policy. With capital market liberalisation, a developing nation with a flexible exchange rate regime wi II experience a high Iy volati Ie exchange rate that respo nds primari Iy to the flow offoreign capital and, as a res ult, will be driven to capital controls. Otherwise, full capital mobility requires these nations to adopt a true fixed exchange rate regime with the loss of monetary policy, such as in Hon g Kong or Argentina.
A pegged exchange rate regime, such as that employed in Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia prior to the fall of 1997 is problematic in combination with capital market liberalisation 2 A key consideration is th at under a pegged-exchange-rate regime, currency ri sk is shifted. to a given degree, from private market participants to the governm e nt. To private agents, the marginal benefit of employing hedg in g instruments appears less than the marginal cost. Many foreign exchange exposures, therefore, go unh edged and the foreign currency denominated debt of firms and businesse will balloon with a devaluation . According to Cooper, at the point when authorities reali se that the exchange rate needs to be devalued so do private market participants Global Capital Flows : Maximising Bene/ils. Minimising Risks 12 1 a nd c urrency spec ul ators, who a re a ble to profit at th e expe nse of nati o na l reserves. Furthe r, as fo re ign c urrency indebted bus ines es scrambl e to bu y up reserves so a5 to hedge th e ir exposure, th ey exert s ignifica nt downwa rd pressure o n the va lue of th e do me ti c c urre ncy. The o utcome is a free-fa lling excha nge va lue. T hi s is co mbined w ith the fact th at th e G 7 nati o ns lack an excha nge rate policy that prov ides for lo ng-te rm stability a mo ng the ir c urrencies. What thi s mean s for deve loping countries that choose to peg to o ne o r mo re of th ese currenc ies is th at eventua ll y, a reva luati o n o r devaluation is in ev itabl e. If the conduct of macroeconomic po licy o r mi croecono mi c reform was wa nting in the interim, o r if the adjustm e nt to pa rity was postpo ned too long, mark ets are like ly to ma ke th ese nati o ns pay harshl y fo r the ir sho rtcomings.
Another concern regarding fin anc ia l libera li sati o n, somewhat sepa rate fro m the cho ice o f exchange rate regim e, is the potentia l loss of mo netary contro l. As po inted out by William son a nd Maha r ( 1998), nati o ns that practi sed monetary po licy thro ugh capital control s ty pi call y do not have a ny, o r least not we ll-developed, money and bo nd markets. Re mov ing these control s leaves a utho rities with no means to contro l mo netary gro wth thro ugh o pen-ma rk et operati ons. Eventually libe ra li sati on leads to the deve lo pme nt of governm ent securities markets and mo neta ry contro l is re to red . T he transi ti o n peri od, howeve r, may prove to be quite un stable, prov iding one ex pla nati on of why many nati ons expe ri ence a fin anc ia l c ri s is fo ll ow in g libe ra li sati on.
The Role of Foreign Capital in Recent Crises
Befo re movin g on to cons ider the appro pri ateness of reform s, it is impol1ant to first cons ide r th e ro le of fo re ign specul ato rs. At th e time o f th e East As ian cri s is, Ma lays ian Prime Mini ster Mah athir Mo hamad bl a med fo re ig n speculators fo r the fi nanc ia l c ri s is that eng ulfed the regio n, sparking a bi tte r de bate w ith the likes of George Soros. Did fo re ign spec ul ators trul y ca use th e fin anc ia l cri s is in th e ir bl ind pu rs uit of pro fit, ' a some c la imed? O r, as a rgued by other, was it the result of impro per macroeconom ic a nd m icroecono m ic po li c ies?
Now th at some tim e has passed s ince the sta rt of th e East As ia n c ri s i , empirical assessments of th e cri s is are beginning to materia li se . T ho ugh th e evidence so fa r is rath er scant, it SuppOI1S the noti on that fo re ign speculato rs were 110 1 the cause of th e cris is. One of th e most recent studies, by C lloe, Kil o, a nd Stul z ( 1999), cons iders the ro le o f fo re ign in vestors in th e co ll a p e of the Ko rean stoc k ma rket in 1997. T he autho rs show that th e mark et adjusted qui ckl y to sales by fore ign in vesto rs and that negati ve abnorm a l return s were not pers iste nt fo llow ing fo re ig n sa les. T he a uth ors prov ide ev ide nce of herdin g behav io ur by fo re ig n in vestors but conv inc in g ly a rg ue that uch be haviour need not be desta bili s ing. The ir results show that do mesti c bu y ing activity dominated fo re ign se llin g activity in th e last three month s of 1997. He nce, there is no ev ide nce th at fore ign speculators were a desta bi I is ing fo rce. Regardin g Tha iland , Laurid sen ( 1999) conc ludes that pri va te sector intermediari es m isha nd led sho rt-te rm capita ls fl ows lead ing to a m isa ll ocati o n i of capital. Tho ug h, in the autho r's o pini on, thi s is the main cause of the cri ses, it was accompan ied by po l iti ca l instabi I ity a nd mi smanageme nt. Jo mo ( 1999) co ncludes th at the re li ance on sho rt-term finan c in g, specul ati o n aga inst th e c urre ncy-basket peg, and injudi c ious po l icy respo nse led to th e co lla p e of the Ma lays ian rin gg it. The " Tequila C ri ses" o f 1994-1995 is exa mined in a spec ia l vo lume of th e Journal of Banking and Finance, edited by Ca lo m iri s ( 1999). Th o ug h th e rev iew o f the lite rature o n thi s epi sode shows some disagreeme nt o n th e ro le of specul ato r , w hat is appa rent is th at is was pro bl e ms in macroecono mi c a nd mi croeconomic fund amenta ls th at made Mexico "v ulnerable to th e w him s of specul ato rs" (p. 145 8).
Finally, in a theoretica l context, Aghi o n, Bacc hetta, a nd B a n e~j ee ( 1999) show that econom ies at an interm edi ate leve l of fin anc ia l deve lopm e nt a re mo re unstable than econo mi es w ith e ithe r full y deve loped o r underdevelo ped fin ancial markets. As a result, inte rm edi ate eco nomies th at unde rgo fin a nc ia l libe ra li sati on may desta bili se the ir econo mi es . Fo re ign direct in vestm e nt, however, is not destabili s ing. The autho rs suggest, therefo re, th at econo mies w ith finan c ial ma rkets at an interm edi ate stage of deve lo pm e nt sho uld care full y plan and pace finan c iallibera li satio n, all owin g FDI but re tri cting po rtfolio fl ows. The importa nce of creating incenti ves fo r FDI is add res ed by Al an Ru gman in a later chapter of thi s text.
Hence, the I iterature suggests that the sources of these fin anc ia l cri ses li es in the mi x of inappropriate mac roecono mic po li cy and in adequate microecono mic re form co upl ed w ith capita l mark et libera li sati on. as o ppo ed to fo re ign specul ati on. Wheth er o ne bl ame pecul ato rs, the conduct of m ic roecono m ic a nd mac roeconom ic po l ic ies. o r th e leve l o f tinanc ia I deve lo pme nt for the fin anc ia l cri es of th e 1990s, th e prev io us secti on or lh i cha pter d emo nstrate th e overarc hing importance of a we ll-deve lo ped. hi ghqu a lity syste m of finan c ia l inte rm edi ari es. F inanc ia l inte rm edi ari es ex ist to save potentia l ho lders o f fin anci a l in strum e nts fro m inc urrin g th e ri sks and
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a ll ow in g them to enjoy red uced costs. the reby enco uragi ng financial specul at ion in the most effic ient sectors of the econo my. In tUI'll . speculators provide the most pro mi sing sectors of the eco no my w ith the li q uidity needed to deve lop and expa nd. Whil e these in stitutions ca nnot e lim inate adve r e se lecti o n and mora l hazard pro ble ms. they ca n co ll ect in fo rm ation abo ut the underl y ing ri skiness of fin anc ia l in strum ents and mo nito r the cont inuin g perfo rm ance of those w ho issue such in strum e nts, the re by reduc in g th e extent of th ese pro ble ms in fi nanc ia l markets .
Preventative Policy: G7 Recommendations
With the benefi ts a nd risks of unh indered cap ita l flows cons idered. what type a nd to w hat extent sho ul d reform effo rts take? Shou ld th ere be a new intern ationa l fina nc ia l archi tecture. o r sho ul d reform s be modest? Eic he ng reen ( 1999, p. 9) ma kes a compe lling, tho ugh blun t, argume nt aga in st proposa ls th at are too grandiose. c la iming th at they are impractica l a nd have " not ' a snowba ll ' s c hance in he ll of be ing imple me nted". G ive n th e compl ex and dy namic nature of the system, one mu st rea li e that the re is no definiti ve answer to the quest io ns proposed here. T hus. the re w ill be cons id e rab le d isagreement on reform s that are com plex and broa d sweep ing. As such. grand proposa ls are non-starters in the c urrent po li t ica l env iro nm ent.
As stated at the o utset of thi s c hapte r. th e o bjective of po l icy and reform shou ld be to max imi se th e benefits w hil e m inimi s ing th e risks assoc iated with capita l market libe ra li sation. T he li terat ure has shown that libera lisat io nneed to be paced acco rdin g to th e level of fi nancia l deve lo pm ent the nat io n fi nds itse lf at. Mic roecono mic po li cy actio ns sho uld free trade fl ows. e ncourage fl ex ibility and competition, and improve regul ation a nd superv is io n o f the nati on s system of interm edi ari es. T he deepenin g of th e market fo r government debt is essent ia l fo r contro lling the mo ney suppl y and a llow in g for d irect fi na nc ing. T he ability to fi na nce directly reduces the impact of ba nking c rises on the real secto r of the econo my a nd prov ides ~or lo ng-run sta bili ty. . In eva lu atin g the GTs proposa ls des igned to prevent po ible future cri ses, thi s section reviews those put fo rward in the Repo rt of the Fin ance M inisters to the K6 1n Economic Summi t ( ee the a ppend ix fo r the full text of th e Re port). Beginning in Ha li fax a nd co ntinuin g in Lyon. the Fina nce Mini ste rs were requested by the leaders to identi fy key areas o f refo rm in the in te rn atio na l fin anc ia l system and to re po rt on in iti ati ves pri or to th e summ its.
The Ka ln Report. th erefo re. is a doc um e nt th at has been in constru ctio n to r fo ur years a nd has evo lved al o ng th e way. It a ll ows fo r a comp re hensive v iew of th e Fi nance Mini sters ' assessment of th e state of th e intern ati o na l fi nanc ia l system. re fo rm s th at have take n place. and proposa l to date. ' T he re po rt. howeve r, is not necessaril y a set of po li cy commitm ents. Rath er it is a pro posal prepared fo r th e G7 leaders ' cons iderati on. No neth e le s. it prov ides a useful mea ns fo r eva luatin g the ty pes a nd like lihood of re to nn to the system .
After rev iew in g th e report. th e ro le of the G7 as a body of g lo ba l govern ance in th e context of the inte rn ati ona l fi nanc ia l system is con ide red. In lig ht of the centra li ty of the G7, th e do minance of th e G7 econo mi e in g lo ba l trade and capita l fl ows, a nd th e fac t that the G7 nati o ns were th e a rchitects of th e current system. a set of responsibilitie is put fo rwa rd. Fulfilm ent of these respo ns ibiliti es is critica l to th e success a we ll -fun ctio nin g g lo ba l fin anc ia l system .
•
General Overview ()fAssessment and Proposals
T he report of the Fin ance Mini sters re fl ects we ll th e wo rk th at has ta ke n place s ince Ha li fax. The docum ent addresses the key areas of strengthe nin g and reforming internati ona l fin anc ia l in stitu t io ns ( IFls): e nh anc in g transpa re ncy a nd promoting best practi ces, strength e nin g financ ia l regul atio n in ind ustri al countries, stre ngthening macroeconomic po li c ies and fina nc ia l system in e merg ing markets, improv ing c ri s is prevention and in vo lvi ng th e pri va te sector. and pro motin g soc ia l po li c ies. At 28 pages in le ngth it i ind eed comprehensive in its assess ment and lo ng in recomm end ati ons. T he repo rt reads a a text on va ri ous refo rm s imple me nted. recomm e nd ed. and pro posed fo r furthe r study. It does a n exce ll ent job of framing th e curre nt s itu atio n in the most genera l sense. T he overa ll q ua lity of th e doc um e nt refl ects the effic ient wo rkings of th e G7 Fina nce Mini sters' meetin gs a nd the com pete nce of the current mini sters and the ir staffs. T he repo rt makes it c lear th at no new in te rn ati o na l o rgani sati o ns are needed (a po int w hi ch is e mphas ised aga in be low). T he theme of th e report is th at fo r in ternati ona l fi nanc ia l mark ets to work prope rl y. enhanced tra nspa re ncy a nd di sclosure as we ll as imp roved regul ati o n a nd superv is io n are necessary. In vo lvement of th e pri vate sector in cri sis ma nage me nt a nd preventi on, as we ll as requirin g th e pri va te secto r to bear respo ns ibili ty fo r ri sk ass umed, is a lso e mphas ised .
Some ofthe key recomm endati on a re that the 1M F a nd Worl d Ba nk need 4 A number of other proposa ls are made for reformin g and improv in g the ex isting I Fls. We leave these to the experts in policy architecture to ga uge their merit.
The Mini sters report opens by stating that a "we ll -fu nct ioning internati onal financial system is essential to all ow an effic ient allocation of globa l sav in gs and investment, and provide the conditi ons needed to improve world-wide growth and living standards in all countries". In th e process, it is made clear that policy responsibility still rests with nati onal authorities and what is envisioned is international co-operation rather than international regulation. International in stitutions, pal1icul arl y the IM F and the World Bank, are asked to improve perfo rm ance in core responsibilities. increase transparency, clearl y del ineate responsibi I ities, and co-operate rather than in crease their scope of regulatory and supervisory acti vities.
.
Risk Management
Much attention is given to ri sk assessment. a challenging task in today 's environment ofsophisticated financial engineering. Banks and other tinancial intermediaries are the focus of reform, given the important role they play in filling information gaps and allocating capital. The reform s of the Basel Committee are held as the sta ndard that all cou ntri es should consider for domestic impl ementation. Unf0l1unatel y, the rev isions ha ve come under fire for not doing enough and not being particul arl y useful to deve lop ing country systems. Deve lopin g nations have argued that they would be at the mercy of rati ng agencies, and though the new standards mi ght ti ghten co ntro ls over banks in deve loped nati ons. may ve ry we ll hurt banks in their nations (Diaz. 2000) . C learl y the emphas is is minimi si ng market imperfect ions and improv ing supervision of financial in stituti? n acti vity rather than regulating it. Capital control s are suggested for developing nations onl y as a transitory too l while the financial sector develops and supervisory abi l iti es improve. The purpose is to limit unhedged short-term borrowing of developing country banks. Though not a first-choice policy in strum ent. the views of the finance mini sters are consistent with the literature suggesti ng that financial deve lopment is a necessa ry condition for stab ility and foreign direct investment (FDI) is preferred to short-term capital flows. as FD I is not destabilising. Eichengreen ( 1999) argues that such taxes are indeed warranted in certain cases, but that they are a third-choice, where improvements in ri sk management and regulatory abilities are the first and second choices. The problem with capital controls is that they reduce the pressures on po licy makers to implement the first and second choices. Further, as the report states, they have not been a very effective in strument in most cases.
Private Sector Bail-In and Involvement
, Pri vate sector bail-in, that is hav ing pri vate sector investors as ume responsi bility for ri sk undertaken, is not only a critical com ponent of crisis management but also crisis prevention, as clear terms for bai I-in wou Id reduce moral hazard. By forcing private sector participants to bear th e financial consequences of their investment decisions through ehanges in debt financing and the reduction of domestic and international safety nets, ex ante expectations are changed and, it is assumed, a more conservative approach to risk will be adopted . The report outlines a framework that recomm ends linkin g offic ial support to the country 's programme of meeting its debt obligations, balancing classes of debt holders if the debt is to be restructured. estab li shin g a reserve tloor fo r private sector contributions in relation to offic ial contributi ons and all owi ng lending into arrears and the use of payment suspensions and capita l contro ls in "exceptional" cases. The report further states that no category of private creditors (bondholders) should be viewed as seni or to any other group (banks). It concludes, however, with an acknowledgement that th e general approach will remain to be applied on a case-by-case basis. Thi s refl ects the disagreement that exists between, primarily, the Americans and other G7 members on how to bail in private bondholders. Because bonds do not typically contain collective action clauses, rescheduling of thi s type of debt is difficult, if possi ble at all. This has led to a mistaken belief that bondho lder ri ghts are held higher than those of other debt holders (The Economist. 1999) . The pro blem with these types of provisions, as we ll as standst i II arrangements and exchange controls, is that they may red uce the quality of the debt in trum ent. Because of this, some have argued that they may actually create an unstable environment that is conducive to a financial cri sis.
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Co-ordinaliol1 of Reform
Private sector :nvolvement in crises prevention is also called for. Little detail is forthcoming on how to accomplish this, however. Eichengreen (1999, p. 7) points out the obstacles to I MF-Ied standard setting and the need to rely on private sector expertise as the "only practical way of promulgating effective standards in the relevant areas". The number and variety of agencies involved in financial architecture reform is quite expansive. In an attempt to categorise the various bodies, the agencies and organisations mentioned explicilly in the report are grouped according to their affiliation with international organ isations, private sector organ isations, and the G7.
Those directly affiliated with the G7, or created by the G7, are the: Far from being an exhaustive list. the above is merely a subset of the bodies involved in reforming the financial ·architecture. It does illu trate, however, the Finance Ministers ' point that no new international body i needed . Rather what is essential for success is overall management of the process that is already in motion .
Shaping a New International Financial System Exchange Rale Manage ment: A Special Problem
As di scu ssed earli er, the appropriate approach to exchange rate manageme nt is a perplexing pro ble m and continues to be a n area of practi ca l disagreement. Many emerging nations choose to peg the va lue of their currency relati ve to a vehic le currency because of their de pe ndence on do lla r-pri ced bas ic commodities, to gain credibility and convertibility, to redu ce transacti o n costs, there by pro moting trade and in vestm ent, and as a means of fig hting inflation. The re are, however, two practi ca l pro ble ms with ri g id exchange rate reg im es. s The first is th at th ey require ado pting nati ons to subju gate moneta ry J po li cy to exchange rate manageme nt rathe r than do mestic o bj ectives. Ma ny nati o ns res ist thi s by steril is ing exchange rate interventio ns, a practi ce that cannot be susta ined. Hence, in the lo ng run the conduct of mac roeconom ic po licy is ofte n incons istent w ith the exchange rate reg ime. The second i that it encourages unhedged bo rrowing, as di scussed earlier.
The fin ance mini sters ' pos ition is that the excha nge rate regim e must be backed by cons istent macroecono mic po lices. Further, they judge that the intern ati ona l community should not prov ide offic ia l fin anc in g to co untri es that peg thei r exchange ra te unless the excha nge va lue is susta ina bl e and " certa in conditio ns" are met. T he repo rt is not firm on thi s issue a nd no a ltern ative reg im es are offered deve loping countri es. Ex peri e nce shows th at bas ket-pegs a nd s ingle-currency-pegs w ill continue to be a popu lar c ho ice a mo ng deve lo ping country po licymakers. They a re. however. d iffic ult to susta in whe n the G7 nati ons do not co-ordinate o n th e ir own exchange va lues. What thi s means fo r deve lo pin g countries th at c hoose to peg to o ne or mo re of these currencies is that, eventua lly, a reva luatio n o r deva luation must be made. I f macroecono mic po licy or microecono mic reform were wanting in the interim, or if th e adjustme nt to parity were postponed too lo ng, markets are like ly to make these nati ons pay ha rshly for the ir sho rtcomings. This was th e case fo r East As ia n countries such as T hai land, Ma lays ia, and Indo nes ia, whic h pegged o r managed th eir currencies aga in st a bas ket th at attac hed a la rge we ig ht to the US do lla r.
Emerging G7 Responsibilities
Fischer (1999) po ints o ut that the reform of the intern ationa l fi nancia l arch itecture rea lly mea ns m icroeconom ic and macroeconom ic correcti o ns underta ken by the deve lo pin g nati ons -th e rec ipi ents of capita l tl ows -the
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deve lo ped nati ons -th e o ri g inators of ca pita l fl ows -and IFls. C lea rl y the po ints of e mph as is in th e G7 re port, banking refo rm a nd inc reased transpa re ncy fo r example, are required by a ll pa rti c ipants of the syste m, but are prim a ril y directed at the rec ipient nati ons. What is the ro le of the G7 as an in stitutio n w ith g lo ba l leadership respo ns ibilities?
T he G7 nati o ns are in a unique pos itio n in regard to the new fi na nc ia l architecture. T hey are the architects of the c urrent system, as deta il ed by Ni cho las Bay ne in C hapter 2. T hey a lso dominate g loba l markets in term s of trade and capita l fl ows, and are the issue rs of th e wo rld 's ve hi c le c urrenc ies. T hey have, therefo re, spec ia l respo ns ibiliti es fo r its reform . Based o n the po ints put fo rward in th is chapte r, the fo ll ow ing 7 ro les fo r the G7 are suggested.
Actively Serve as the New Financial Architecture ',\' (jeneral Con tractor
T he G7 should co-ordinate and set agendas, establish time lin es fo r resul ts, a nd make recommendatio ns for research. As an institutio n, the G7 does not have any " turf' issues w ith other organi satio ns, it is not an agent of any o rgani sati on (other th an the leaders themse lves), a nd ca n exerc ise conside rable contro l over ma ny in stituti ons suc h as th e IMF. Be ing at th e centre of the process, the G7 Mini sters must ta ke respons ibili ty fo r coo rdinating th e process, serve as th e dri vin g fo rce fo r implementati o n, a nd act as th e lead ing advocates of th e benefits of capita l market I ibera li sati o n.
Co-ordinate and/or Co-operate among Themselves
T he G7 mu st acti ve ly co-operate, and when practi ca ll y feas ibl e, co-ord in ate mi croeconomic a nd macroeconomic po lices. Co-ope rati on is needed o n microeconomi c po lic ies, such as fin anc ia l market regul atio ns a nd taxes so as not to create di sto rti ons that lead to an ineffi c ient flow of ca pita l. Coo rdinati on o n de bt-ho lder c la uses is needed s ince no country w ill unil atera ll y ado pt suc h c lauses and run the ri sk of lowerin g the qu a l ity of th e ir de bt. Macroeconomic co-operati on is need to ma inta in a enviro nm ent conduc ive to sta ble capita l fl ows, inc ludi ng exchange rate stabili ty a nd the avo ida nce of un susta ina bl e exte rn a l defic its.
Encourage Competition
T he G7 must e ncourage compet itio n, parti cul arl y Illult i late ra I trade liberali sation and the Multilateral Agreement on In ve tment (MA l). As discussed earlier, trade liberali sati on is a precursor to financialliberali ati on. Without it, di tortions ex ist that result in the ineffic ient di stributi on of cap ital with bubbl es resulting in particular sectors of the economy. Competition is al 0 required in the bankin g sectors of both developed and deve lop in g nat ions to ensure a hea lthy system of intermedi aries.
-I. Encourage and Allow jar Broader Participation
The G7 should, and will, remain an exc lusive club. It should all ow. however and whenever appropriate, broader participation. In clu sion of the developing and emerging nations will enhance the credibility of reform s that are forthcom ing from the process and give these nations ome "ownership" of the process. These two aspects are certainly needed to summ on th e political will for change, given the current backl as h that ex ists ~a in s t integrati on. and the political will to endure in the mid st ofa cri is .
Continue Work on Standards
Because of the dynamic nature of financial markets, financial engineering, and the activities of multinational enterprises, appropri ate standard s and best practices are not static. The G7 is the body th at mu st see that work on transparency. corporate governance, and ri sk management sta ndards continues, even though stab ility may temporaril y return.
Provide Incentives
Many of the reform measures mention ed above require maj or chan ge and unilateral adoption by developing nati ons. The G7 must enco urage the ir adoption by providing incenti ves and reward s for those co untri es th at conform and maintain compliance. The Council on Foreign Relations (1999, p. 172) refers to this as " Rewards for joining the Good Housekeeping Club" . These incentives would include co nditi onin g lending term s with performance and redu cing regulatory ca pital req uirements for banks. The G7 mu I also avoid generati ng market distortions through its own regulato ry action . uch a the tand ards for cap ital req uirements are all eged to have done.
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Do Not Over-Advertise T he G7 must avo id overstating, o r a ll ow ing to be overstated, the beneti ts of modest refo rm measures suc h as improved transpa re ncy a nd survei ll ance. Financ ial cri ses w ill occas iona ll y occur; th at is the nature of the beast. O ve rstating the effects redu ces the credibility o f re fo rm e ffo rts in th e eyes of th e most shrewd market participants whil st understating th e ex i ting ma rk et risk to th ose participants less savvy.
The internati onal fin anc ial architecture is a public good and. th e refore. its reform affects many nati ons outs ide of the G7. G ive n the centra lity of the G7 in g lo ba l govern ance, however, the G7 fi nds itse lf in a unique pos ition o r respo ns ibility . T he seven respo ns ibilities outlined above co nst itute a n important ro le fo r the G7 Mini sters. Meeting th ese o bligatio ns is critica l for a credibl e and ba lanced approach to strength e ning the in te rn ati o na l fi na nc ia l a rc h itecture.
Conclusion
Capita l ma rket liberalisation offers deve loping nati o ns the cap ita l neces ary fo r growth a nd inc reased stand ards ofl iving. Increas ing capita l mob ili ty i the mea ns fo r mo re effic ie nt capi ta l a ll ocati o n and wo rld-wide econo mic ga in s that resul t. T hese benefits, however, are accompa ni ed by ri sks that pe rvade fi nanc ia l mark ets. T he appro pria te approach to reform of the in te rn ati o na l fin anc ia l a rc h itecture is one th at seeks to max im ise th e benetits wh i Ie minimi s ing the ri sks.
The Report of th e Finance Mini sters to th e Ko ln Econom ic Summ it is a li ving docum ent th at refl ects the e fforts of th e G7 and va ri o us inte rn ati o na l and do mesti c o rgani sati ons reform efforts s ince the Ha lifax Summit in 1995 . T he recomm endati ons co nta ined in the re port are conservati ve in nature a nd. in cases where di ffe re nces in opin io n re ma in , ma in ta in a market-o ri e nted approach. As such, few deta il s are g ive n, makin g impl ementatio n in ma ny areas mo re di ffic ult. Furthe r, as re fl ected ' in the report, a vast num ber of o rgani sati o ns, age nc ies, a nd comm ittees are in vo lved in the proce 's a nd overa ll co-o rd inatio n presents a dau ntin g task. Noneth e less, a ppro priate pri vate secto r ex perti se is inc luded in for ming acco untin g and a udi t in g sta nd a rds, and sta nd ards fo r supervis io n, regul atio n, transpa rency. pri va te secto r in vo lveme nt, and ri sk management a re th e core e leme nts needed for effective reform . The most important c ha ll enge th at th e G7 now face is to co-ordinate the process and , as stated in implementation" . The endurance of the G7 determine the success or failure of reform.
Notes
the report, ··to encourage in this regard wi ll ultim ately See Jeffrey A. Frankel ( 1999) for an excellent and intuiti ve di scuss ion on thi s issue. 2 See Daniels. ToumanotT. and von der Ruhr ( 1999) for a di sl:uss ionof the currencybasket-peg arrangements and estimates of their currency wci ghts lu r these nation s. 3
Till: reliability of communiques as a public record of policy intenti ons is now IV<!II establi shed in the literature. t!.g .. von Furstenberg and Daniels. 1992. 4 I-Icncc. we concur with Duncan Wood 's position in Chapter 4 that much more lH:eds to be done to include the likely candidates of the next signilicant cri sis. the large de veloping nation s experiencing linancialliberali sation and tinancial development. 5
In addition to the tlVO papers on thi s subj ect that appear in thi s text. sec Eichengreen e f al. (1999) lor an analys is of the probl' em of transition Irom one regime to anothcr.
